An Reflection on St. Augustine’s Defense of Slavery in City of God

In Augustine’s City of God, disparate forms of subservient relations are laid out in the foundations for a temporal social order that aims at mimicking the ideal peace of the eternal city of Heaven. Embedded in City of God is the notion, according to Augustine, that every individual’s desire is achieving peace, even those who wage war against another. City of God is a project that mirrors Plato’s Republic: both works’ purpose is broadcasting the image of an ideal society and laying the laws for how individuals can achieve the greatest virtues. Hence, throughout the piece, Augustine seems to claim that the purpose of becoming virtuous is achieving peace. The notion of peace is like a Platonic form that perfectly exists in the eternal order of Heaven and can potentially be achieved in the temporal order of society. Therefore, peace can become reside in different microcosms: within the individual self in the struggle against sin, within a household’s relations of blood and servitude, and within a city as a whole. In order to achieve temporal peace, Augustine seems to indicate that there are some relationships of subservience that are necessary, such as loyalty-like obedience to the paterfamilias in a patriarchal system, and slavery. Throughout City of God Augustine details the role of slavery within the struggle for peace in the temporal social order instead of condemning slavery. This seems to beckon the question, why is slavery necessary for the quest for peace in the temporal social order, according to Augustine in City of God? Within this work, Augustine seems to be contradictory in his acceptance of slavery and his quest to emulate the eternal order. Therefore, since temporal order should strive to reflect the eternal order of heaven and Augustine admits that slavery does not exist in the afterlife, as we are all equal in the eyes of God, then temporal peace does not necessitate slavery; hence, Augustine should have rejected the necessity of slavery for peace.

Peace is a pivotal desire for every individual, as Augustine claims in City of God: “every man is in quest of peace” (Augustine, City of God, 866-12). Peace is the common ground between the eternal order of Heaven and the temporal order of men: while peace itself is an ideal of which perfection dwells in Heaven, relative peace can also be attainable in the world of man. In fact, the temporal order Augustine constructs is a set of laws for how to live a virtuous life. Everyone should aspire to become virtuous in their lifetime so as to achieve eternal peace in the afterlife. Augustine seems to promise that those who are virtuous “will be possessed of the reward of victory, the everlasting peace which no adversary can disturb” (Augustine, 864-10). Being virtuous is a direct result of achieving peace, “the ultimate bliss […] that knows no destructive end” (Augustine, 864-10), because by achieving peace individuals are one step closer to God. Nevertheless, every philosophy has its own limited truth: real happiness can only be achieved in eternal peace, admits Augustine—but individuals can try to obtain it in the temporal order. The temporal order must strive to be an accurate reflection of the eternal order, and a means to achieve that goal is achieving peace. Everyone—even those that wage war—aspire for peace: “Indeed, even when men choose war, their only wish is for victory; which shows that their desire in fighting is for peace with glory” (Augustine, 866-12). Peace also moves those who are so sinful that they embody evil, such as the mythological creature Cacus, whose “only desire was for a peace in which no one should disturb him” (Augustine, 867-12). Thus Augustine seems to infer that peace is a natural desire, and that no matter what the will is moved by, in being moved it is always directed towards achieving peace.

For Augustine in , peace takes many forms, natural elements that comprise stability and tranquility. Augustine enumerates several different domains in which peace is realized to achieve temporal tranquility. Among these, several must be a balance of forces within the self: “the peace of the body […] in duly ordered proportion, [of] the irrational soul [in] duly repose of the appetites, [of] the rational soul [is the] agreement between cognition and action” (Augustine, 870-13). The self is the smallest unit that manifests peace, the smallest cosmos in which one must firstly attain peace to be able to work within a slightly larger peaceful cosmos such as the household. Of this, Augustine suggests that “the peace of a home is the ordered agreement among those who live together about giving and obeying orders” (Augustine, 870-13). This is especially important because the temporal order, as a reflection of the eternal order, should also reflect the relations of subservience: “peace between mortal man and God is an ordered obedience, in faith, in subjection to an everlasting law”—which occurs not only in the mortal covenant between God and man, but it is also everlasting in heaven, eternal peace. Hence, it seems that in the definition of peace itself and its declinations, Augustine admits that obedience and order are necessary for peace—one between God and man but also among men. Insofar as the peace is just and beneficial, then the peace in this relation is aiming towards the greater good—God—and emulates the eternal order in heaven.

The notion of a peaceful home is one which Augustine lays out clearly in : the family is a reflection of the city’s cosmos, and the individuals within it must cooperate with one another for the ultimate purpose of peace. “The peace of a home is the ordered agreement among those who lie together about giving and obeying orders” (Augustine, 870-13): this ordered agreement about giving and obeying orders creates a vertically hierarchical familial structure which sees at the head the , the father of the home. According to Augustine, therefore, patriarchy is necessary to maintain the peace in the household because like God, peace proceeds from the father to his wife, children, and especially slaves. In fact, especially slaves are addressed by Augustine, in a way that rhetorically likens them to the behavior of children. This use of language creates a subordination between the father and every other household participant. Therefore, he likens children and slaves alike; naturally, it can be discerned that slaves have child-like temper and their submissiveness. According to Augustine, fathers “are concerned for the welfare of all in their households […] as if they were all their children” (Augustine, 876-15) and has the responsibility to redirect the individuals in the household when they are straying from the peace. Disobedience to the orders of the father is “an enemy to domestic peace” (Augustine, 876-15) because disobedience breaks the chain of servitude from one individual to the next. In fact, if anyone were to disrupt the family peace, the should reprove the individual with punishment that is “just and legitimate […] intended to readjust [the offender] to domestic peace”. The issue of punishment is also one Augustine underscores. According to Augustine punishment should be just, and by virtue of being just, should be beneficial for the slave more than the master. In fact, he concedes that punishment should not originate from the master’s pride or masochism of sorts, but from wanting to benefit the behavior of the slave in function of seeking peace. Moreover, Augustine admits that slavery might be worse for the master, insofar that punishing should not be pleasant or done lightheartedly. However, it still seems as though the idea of temporal “punishment” between men in a relationship of obedience substitutes for God. In a sense, men put themselves in the same position of a God they consider the only power to eternally will and punish.

Nevertheless, Augustine concedes that peace can also exist without a beneficial ordering of things, which is a reflection of the incorrect arrangement of nature’s law and existence. However, he also explains that no community can survive without peace because it would mean its disintegration. Augustine presents the case of a robber who is clearly sinful because he steals, yet when he comes home, he is still the and demands obedience. The robber “scolds and punishes; and if need be, he employs savage measures to impose on his household a peace which, he feels, cannot exist unless all the other elements in the same domestic society are subject to one head” (Augustine, 867-12). Hence, although the thief strives for peace, it is at the expense of others, and thus cannot possibly be good. Similarly, Augustine hypothesizes how the thief’s rule could be if he were offered to rule over a city and concludes that “they should all show the same subservience he had demanded from his household [and] the same greed and malignity would persist in him” (Augustine, 867-12). Therefore, it seems that Augustine is implying that even though peace is supposed to be necessary for the temporal order to be like the eternal order, temporal peace is a doubtful good because individuals do not know its perfect, heavenly form. Augustine himself admits that “even peace is a doubtful good, since we do not know if the hearts of those with whom we wish to maintain peace” (Augustine, 858-5): not only do we not know who we should maintain peace with, but he implies knowing the other’s motives for peace is also essential.

The concept of slavery seems to be implied by Augustine to be a natural condition for peace because it maintains the status quo of relations in the household and in the city. Obedience and subservience are necessary to maintain strict relationships that maintain the social structure of the temporal order unaltered and therefore peaceful. In fact, as aforementioned, every man’s desire is to achieve and maintain peace, and stability. Nevertheless, slavery seems to implicate a sense of immobility within the social structure of Augustine’s ideal temporal order that goes beyond a patriarchal structure. Augustine states that there should be a “just” social order and that the slave should get his freedom if he can and if the conditions are unjust, yet, these are not only unrealistic conditions, but also would disrupt the peace if every slave desired freedom. Slavery seems to be necessary to avoid agitation of the much sought-after peace, yet its acceptance contradicts many of the eternal order’s principles that the temporal order is supposed to emulate. In fact, slavery is necessary for just peace, as Augustine seems to imply.

Slavery is a form of subjugation of one individual to another that comes in the form of physical and mental constraint: one individual is trapped serving the other, creating a fettered immobility for the slave. According to Augustine, “even the wicked when they go to war do so to defend the peace of their own people […] so that all men and things might come together to be subservient to one master” (Augustine, 868-12). There is an apparent contradiction with a later statement by Augustine that indicates that this is a result of pride, “a perverted imitation of God” (Augustine, 868-12). Yet, this incites the question of how significant are motives for subjugating another person. Whether it be pride, or even love, subjugation and the consequent subservience are a hate of the “fellowship of equality under God” (Augustine, 868-12). Equality renders every individual the same in the eternal order of heaven and God, which is in stark contrast with the acceptance and justification of slavery in the temporal order, as the temporal order should primarily aim at emulating the eternal order.

Moreover, Augustine states that “peace between men is an ordered agreement of mind with mind” (Augustine, 870-13), which automatically excludes the anchored hierarchical structure that slavery is between a master and his slave. In fact, an agreement of mind with mind is that which excludes punishment and subservience that is typical of slavery. A relationship, albeit consensual, of obeying and commanding is still a relationship of hierarchy, not of agreement of mind with mind: one mind is superior to the other. Individuals, to achieve peace, must be in agreement of mind with mind, which seems to logically exclude the physical torment of slavery, as it does not recognize this egalitarian covenant of minds, but creates an artificial superiority of one man over another. Moreover, Augustine recognizes that “[God] did not wish the rational being […] to have dominion over any but irrational creatures, not man over man, but man over beasts” (Augustine, 874-15). If it is not in God’s will that man might rule over man, hence master over slave, it seems illogical to presume the next point that Augustine makes: that the “condition of slavery is justly imposed on the sinner” (Augustine, 874-15). The fact that slavery can be based on sin is entirely problematic. That slavery is imposed on a sinner conflicts firstly with the hereditary aspect of slavery (a child born to slaves was himself a slave) and secondly with the randomness that this entails. Even though Augustine believes in Providence, there is a contra diction with the hereditary element of slavery because Providence should work so that God’s will may grace individuals, and yet the majority of slaves do not have the freedom to free themselves and be graced. Rather, if slavery is “justly” imposed on sinners, and if anyone is prone to sinning, then anyone could be a slave, which means that the relation between master and slave is in reality fleeting and unstable. The instability of this relation undermines the peace of the household: if the relation between master and slave is in essence a result of the randomness of history, then peace of the household is as random as the master-slave relationship.

Furthermore, Augustine’ argument for waging war for the protection of one’s peace aforementioned, directly seems to conflict with the argument that “war is fought in defense of [the] sin that the other side is contending […] and victory […] is a humiliation visited on the conquered by divine judgment either to correct or to punish their sins” (Augustine, 875-15). This would imply that the conquered justly deserve the divine judgment in the form of slavery. However, again, this seems an inaccurate analysis because it tries to analyze war through ideas of divine intervention, a deterministic sort of fate that is based on the level of sinfulness of each side. Again, this undermines the necessity of slavery for peace because the presence of slavery in the temporal social order does not avoid future instability or future war.

It is evident therefore that peace does not necessitate slavery, as Augustine seems to imply in , as slavery does not guarantee neither peace of the household nor of the city. The notion that slavery may be justified by divine intervention is contrary to the ideal held by the Christian God, who in Scripture repeatedly mentions that in God’s eyes all men (and women) are equal. Divine intervention does not settle squabbles, but it should, as Augustine suggests, lead to perfecting the temporal order.